Using student self-reported cheating admissions and answers from a hypothetical cheating scenario, this paper analyzes the effects of individual and situational factors on potential cheating behavior. Results confirm several conclusions about student factors that are related to cheating. The probability of cheating is associated with younger students, lower GPAs, alcohol consumption, fraternity/sorority membership, and having cheated in high school. Student perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment appear to have a negative and significant impact on the probability of cheating (...) on in-class assignments. Students who report a belief that cheating is never acceptable appear to be significantly less likely to cheat in any circumstance. This study illustrates the context-dependent nature of academic dishonesty, and the associated difficulty in understanding the relationships between measurable factors and cheating behavior. (shrink)

An object's disposition to A in circumstances C is masked if circumstances C obtain without the object Aing. This paper explores an analogous sense in which abilities can be masked, and it uses the results of this exploration to motivate an analysis of agents' abilities in terms of dispositions. This analysis is then shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to (...) incompatibilism concerning free action and determinism, the paper concludes by using the dispositional analysis of abilities to argue for compatibilism, and to show why the 'master argument' for incompatibilism is unsound. (shrink)

Philosophy for the 21st Century, an introductory anthology, is an extraordinarily comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings. It covers all major fields, including not only metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion, but also philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, political philosophy, and philosophy of art. This volume is unique in drawing on the judgments of a new generation of scholars, each of whom has chosen the articles and provided the introduction for one section of the (...) book. These associate editors--Delia Graff, Robin Jeshion, L. A. Paul, Jesse Prinz, Stuart Rachels, Gabriela Sakamoto, David Sosa, and Cynthia A. Stark--are at the forefront of 21st-century philosophy. Their selections include the work of such leading contemporary thinkers as Nancy Cartwright, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, Derek Parfit, and Sydney Shoemaker, along with classic works from 2500 years of philosophy. The book has been structured to maximize continuity, and an introductory essay by Simon Blackburn explains the tools of symbolic logic. This groundbreaking volume sets a new standard for introducing students to the importance and fascination of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: If an event of one kind does not always lead to an event of a second given kind, it does not follow (of course) that the occurrence of an event of the first kind can never explain the occurrence of an event of the second kind. I’m concerned here with cases of belief. In the service of defending a plausible “boundary-shifting” solution to the sorites paradox, I argue that a certain paradoxical belief(in the universally-generalized premise of the sorites paradox) (...) can be explained by our having reasonable beliefs that entail it (beliefs in the instances of that generalization). Some have argued against boundary-shifting solutions on the grounds that beliefs in instances do not always lead to beliefs in generalizations over those instances. I argue that the objection flounders. An event of one kind can explain an event of another kind even if events of the first kind do not always lead to events of the second kind. One does not impugn an explanation merely by pointing to its defeasibility. (shrink)

The central question addressed in this dissertation is, What, in the most general terms, is required for an object to have a disposition? In the formal mode, this is just the question, What are the truth conditions of disposition ascriptions, sentences of the form "N is disposed to M when C"? The dissertation begins by criticizing existing answers to this question, answers which consist in accounts of disposition ascriptions according to which they entail conditionals of one form or another. By (...) developing examples due to C. B. Martin, Mark Johnston and others, it is argued that no conditional account of disposition ascriptions can be correct. Instead, a "Habitual Account" of disposition ascriptions is defended: an ascription "N is disposed to M when C" is true just in case N has some intrinsic property in virtue of which N Ms when C. This account is shown both to escape the criticisms levelled against conditional accounts, and to have independently persuasive motivation. ;Essential to the Habitual Account of disposition ascriptions is that the sentences that it makes use of, so-called "habitual sentences" of the form "N Ms when C," are not themselves to he understood as conditionals. How they are to be understood has been a matter of some debate in the recent semantics literature, and the dissertation engages with this debate by offering a novel account of the truth conditions of habitual sentences. It is argued that these sentences should be represented as containing an implicit, unpronounced adverbial quantifier, meaning something like "normally," "generally," or "typically," and a specific account of the semantic contribution made to habitual sentences by this quantifier is supplied. ;The dissertation ends by considering an issue in the metaphysics of dispositions, arguing, contrary to widespread philosophical opinion, that some dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers. This conclusion is shown not only to be compatible with the Habitual Account of disposition ascriptions, but also to be explained by it. (shrink)

Descriptions are predicates. Here, I'll take this to mean either of two basically equivalent things: that they have extensions as their semantic values, sets of entities, in the broadest sense; or that they have type-〈e,t〉 functions as their semantic values, functions from entities, in the broadest sense, to truth values. An entity in the broadest sense is anything that can be the subject of a first-order predication. Examples are individuals, pluralities, masses, and kinds. Here I'm including entities in this broadest (...) sense because my thesis that descriptions are predicates applies to all sorts of descriptions: singular descriptions, plural definite descriptions, mass descriptions, kind descriptions, and indefinite descriptions as well. (shrink)

Islamic philosophy ; Philosophical anthropology.

Ghazzālī, 1058-1111; Kīmiyā-yi saʻādat -Criticism and interpretation ; Ghazzālī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, -1126; Savāniḥ -Criticism and interpretation ; Ghazzālī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, -1126; Baḥr al-muḥabbat fī asrār al-muvaddat fītafsīr Sūrah-i Yūsuf -Criticism.

Dintre fenomenele mentale, nici unul nu pare să reziste atât de bine explicaţiei precum conştiinţa. Parţial, dificultatea se datorează faptului că folosim termenul „conştient” şi alţii înrudiţi să dea seama de anumite fenomene distincte ale căror legături nu sunt întotdeauna clare. Iar acest lucru duce adesea la amestecarea acestor fenomene distincte. De aceea, orice încercare de a explica conştiinţa trebuie să înceapă prin a distinge diferitele lucruri pe care le numim conştiinţă. Un astfel de fenomen este strâns legat de simplul (...) fapt de a fi în stare de veghe. Noi descriem oamenii şi alte fiinţe ca fiind conştienţi atunci când sunt în stare de veghe şi sistemele lor senzoriale sunt receptive într-un mod normal pentru o stare de veghe. Numesc acest fenomen conştiinţă a fiinţei. În acest sens, conştiinţa este o chestiune biologică, constând în aceea că o fiinţă nu este inconştientă – adică, aproximativ starea opusă somnului sau KO-ului. Însă noi folosim termenul „conştiinţă” şi pentru alte fenomene care par mult mai greu accesibile înţelegerii şi explicaţiei. Astfel, distingem nu numai între fiinţe conştiente şi inconştiente, ci şi între stări mentale ce sunt conştiente şi cele ce nu sunt. Voi numi această a doua proprietate conştiinţă de stare. Este bine cunoscut faptul că nu toate stările mentale sunt conştiente. Stări intenţionale precum credinţele şi dorinţele apar în mod vădit fără a fi conştienţi.1 Şi, în ciuda unor diferenţe de opinie asupra chestiunii, voi argumenta că acelaşi lucru este adevărat şi în privinţa stărilor senzoriale precum durerile şi senzaţiile de culoare. Asemenea stări nu numai că pot apărea în mod inconştient, dar adesea o şi fac.2 Deşi conştiinţa fiinţei şi conştiinţa de stare sunt proprietăţi distincte, este foarte posibil să fie legate în diferite moduri. Poate că, de exemplu, fiinţele trebuie ele însele să fie conştiente pentru ca oricare stare mentală a lor să fie conştientă, deşi dacă visurile obişnuite sunt vreodată stări conştiente, ele constituie contraexemple ale acestei generalizări.3 Oricum ar sta lucrurile în această privinţă, proprietatea conştiinţei fiinţei este relativ neproblematică. Putem constata aceasta luând în considerare fiinţe mai puţin înzestrate mental decât noi ale căror stări mentale nu sunt niciodată conştiente, nici măcar atunci când sunt în stare de veghe.4 Toate stările lor mentale sunt asemănătoare stărilor mentale inconştiente în care ne aflăm atunci când suntem trezi.. (shrink)

Son yıllarda İslam hukukunun kökeni ve gelişimi üzerine önemli çalışmalar yapılmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, hicrî birinci yüzyıl ile ilgili temel kaynakların olmayışı veya eksikliği dolayısıyla, bu dönemde rivayet edilen bilgilerin doğruluğu hakkında bazı şüpheler dile getirilmiştir. Bu nedenle, Risâletü’l-Ferâ’iḍ olarak adlandırılan yeni ve güvenilir eseri incelemenin önemli bir boşluğu dolduracağı kanaatindeyiz. Bu eserin, ilk olarak Zeyd b. Sâbit tarafından kaleme alındığı ve daha sonra hem birinci hem de ikinci yüzyıllarda yaşayan Ebu’z-Zinâd tarafından tefsir edildiği kabul edilir. Bu çalışmada, Muvaṭṭa’ ile Risâletü’l-Ferâiḍ’ (...) arasındaki otuz beşe yakın paragraftaki benzerlikten hareketle Risâlatü’l-Ferâiḍ’in, Muvaṭṭa’ın yazımı sürecinde bir kaynak olarak hizmet ettiği ve ayrıca Medine ehlinin ameli hakkında önemli bilgiler içerdiği tespit edilecektir. Son olarak, bu risalenin analizi ile temel hadis koleksiyonlarının sadece şifâhî rivâyetlere değil, bununla beraber yazılı belgelere de dayandığına dair iddianın daha isabetli olduğu ortaya çıkacaktır. (shrink)

Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...) about the past which are alterable, and argue that God's prior beliefs about human actions are soft facts about the past. (shrink)

What is meaning? How is linguistic communication possible? What is the nature of language? What is the relationship between language and the world? How do metaphors work? The Philosophy of Language, Sixth Edition, is an excellent introduction to such fundamental questions. Incorporating insights from new coeditor David Sosa, the sixth edition collects forty-eight of the most important articles in the field, making it the most up-to-date and comprehensive volume on the subject. Revised to address changing trends and contemporary developments, the (...) sixth edition features eighteen new articles, including influential work by Kent Bach, Paul Boghossian, M. A. E. Dummett, Delia Graff Fara, Hartry Field, H. P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, Carl G. Hempel, Saul Kripke, Benson Mates, Hilary Putnam, Diana Raffman, Nathan Salmon, Stephen Schiffer, John R. Searle, Roy Sorenson, David Sosa, Dennis Stampe, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. A general introduction and introductions to each section give students background to the issues and explain the connections between them. A bibliography of suggested further reading follows each section. (shrink)

Trata-se, neste artigo, de investigar as noções de filosofia, pedagogia e espírito à luz dos debates decoloniais. Neste sentido, a partir de um diálogo que procuro estabelecer com Enrique Dussel, Catherine Walsh e M. Jacqui Alexander, desenvolvo três hipóteses. Em primeiro lugar, apresento certa noção de pedagogia como constitutiva da própria filosofia (portanto, a ideia de pedagogia para além de mero instrumento, meio ou termo acessório à filosofia). Em segundo lugar, argumento que essa dita pedagógica-filosófica precisará ser entendida como a (...) epistemologia indispensável para a abordagem, conhecimento e tratamento da realidade, no seguinte sentido: mediante o aprender e o ensinar alternadamente (como práxis, atitude e método filosófico por excelência), tornar possível que a realidade apareça. E esse é mais um dos pontos em relação aos quais os três autores estão de acordo, assim como em relação ao terceiro e mais importante movimento da presente investigação. Pois será, então, do reconhecimento do fracasso da ontologia universalista (moderna e colonial), mais precisamente, do encontro com uma realidade indeterminada e aberta, que se poderá a fundo compreender o sentido da atitude pedagógica (da epistemologia pedagógica) que descerra toda a realidade possível. Tal realidade_ _sempre Outra_ _– que não se pode localizar em qualquer lugar ou tempo, na mesma medida em que se faz presente em todos os lugares e momentos – é o que se poderá caracterizar como espírito. E é o que fará do espírito, por conseguinte, agência de resistência e perturbação a todo esforço epistemológico/filosófico, tanto quanto (e por isso mesmo) da atitude pedagógica-filosófica instância de revelação de um mundo prenhe de sentidos possíveis. (shrink)

This article looks at some of the salient analyses of moderation in the ancient Greek and the Islamic traditions and uses them to develop a contemporary view of the matter. Greek ethics played a huge role in shaping the ethical views of the Muslim philosophers and theologians, and thus the article starts with an overview of the revival of contemporary western virtue ethics--in many ways an extension of Platonic-Aristotelian ethics--and then looks at the place of moderation or temperance in Platonic-Aristotelian (...) ethics. This sets the stage for an exposition of the position taken by Ibn Miskawayh and al-Ghazali, which is then used as a backdrop for suggesting a revival of the Quran's virtue ethics. After outlining a basis for its virtue ethics, the Quranic view of wasatiyya or moderation is discussed briefly. (shrink)

In “Imposing Risks,” Judith Thomson gives a case in which, by turning on her stove, she accidentally causes her neighbor’s death. She claims that both the following are true: (1) she ought not to have caused her neighbor’s death; (2) it was permissible for her to turn her stove on. In this paper it is argued that it cannot be that both (1) and (2) are true, that (2) is true, and that therefore (1) is false. How this is so (...) is explained, and the implications of this position regarding the relation between rights and duties is explored. (shrink)

Plato's Timaeus contains a powerful and influential myth, of the construction of the universe by a divine craftsman. A god imposes reason on necessity, to bring order from a primeval 'receptacle' of disordered matter. There results the 'child' that is the cosmos - a copy of an eternally-existing perfect model. Here eight new essays from a distinguished international cast, explore aspects of this challenging work: the principles of the mythical narrative, how the world soul and human body are formed, implications (...) for illness - mental and physical, the importance of music and harmonious proportion. Later developments are also treated: Aristotle's theory of generation, the commentary of Proclus and elements of modern evolutionary theory. (shrink)

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains (...) how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology. (shrink)

According to the standard analysis of degree questions, the logical form of a degree question contains a variable that ranges over individual degrees and is bound by the degree question operator how. In contrast with this, we claim that the variable bound by the degree question operator how does not range over individual degrees but over intervals of degrees, by analogy with Schwarzschild and Wilkinson's proposal regarding the semantics of comparative clauses. Not only does the interval-based semantics predict the existence (...) of certain readings that are not predicted under the standard view, it is also able, together with other natural assumptions, to account for the sensitivity of degree questions to negative islands, as well as for the fact, uncovered by Fox and Hackl, that negative islands can be obviated by some properly placed modals. Like Fox and Hackl, we characterize negative island effects as arising from the fact that the relevant question, due to its meaning alone, can never have a maximally informative answer. Contrary to Fox and Hackl, however, we do not need to assume that scales are universally dense, nor that the notion of maximal informativity responsible for negative islands is blind to contextual parameters. (shrink)

Ethics and the Clinical Encounter explores the moral dimensions of clinical medicine and the phenomenon of illness, to determine what ethics must be in order to be fully responsive to clinical encounters. Written in a lively and conversational style with minimal technical terminology, and enhanced by actual experience or real clinical situations, this volume lays out a clinical ethics methodology both in practical and theoretical terms. Here's what the experts had to say: Professor Zaner has provided us with a remarkably (...) lucid and trenchant discussion of the interface of philosophy and the field of medicine. He brings into play an extraordinary range of historial knowledge, extensive observations based on firsthand experience with medical practices, and an acute sense of philosophical argumentation. This is a work that will be an exemplary and indispensable text in the philosophy of medicine for years to come. -- Calvin Schrag... it is a highly original contribution usable in a number of fields.... It really has no competition.... The genius of Zaner's approach is to ground ethics from the 'bottom up' and to direct us to the concrete particulars of therapeutic encounters wherein lie moral and ethical matters... meaty, challenging, and ultimately rewarding.... -- Paul R. Dokecki Richard M. Zaner founded the Center for Clinical and Research Ethics at Vanderbilt University Medical Center. Having established Vanderbilt's first Hospital Ethics Committee (1985), he served as co-chair of VUMC's Ethics Committee since its inception in 1990. Zaner has published five original books, edited ten, and translated four more, and has published more than 100 sections of books and professional journals. (shrink)

Scott Soames argues that interpreted in the light of Quine's holistic verificationism, Quine's thesis of underdetermination leads to a contradiction. It is contended here that if we pay proper attention to the evolution of Quine's thinking on the subject, particularly his criterion of theory individuation, Quine's thesis of underdetermination escapes Soames' charge of paradoxicality.

This article is focused on some conditions in today’s world of globalized media, which are producing either an uncritical acquiescence or fright in Muslim societies as a result of the interaction between these societies and the contemporary Western powers that represent modernity and postmodernity on the global stage. The rise of fundamentalism, a tendency toward returning to the roots and stringently insisting upon some pure and literal interpretation of them, in almost all the religions of the world is a manifestation (...) of this fright. The central concern of this article is to suggest that fundamentalism is neither the only nor the most reasonable response for Muslim societies in the face of contemporary modernity. Muslims need to adopt an independent and critical attitude toward modernity and reshape their societies in the light of the ethics of the Qur’an, keeping in view the historical link between Islam and science in as much as Islamic culture paved the way for emergence of modern science during European Renaissance. The necessity of a pluralistic or contextualized modernization of Muslim societies is discussed along with the need for the removal of cultural duplicity in the role of the West in relation to Muslim societies. All this leads to an overall proposal for modernization which is given towards the end. (shrink)

In the General Psychopathology Jaspers famously draws a distinction between the understandable and explainable. Meaningful connections between psychic events, he argues, can only be understood empathetically and cannot be explained causally. The idea behind this distinction, according to some interpreters at least, seems to be that psychic events do not fall under any general causal rules whereas ordinary events do fall under such rules. Also Jaspers distinguishes empathetic understanding of the connection between two psychic events from a mere interpretation of (...) it, which may turn out to be false. Hence, understanding seems to be able to give us the truth about the connection and is factive as well as self-evident in nature. Contemporary epistemologists, such as Linda Zagzebsky, Duncan Pritchard, and Jonathan Kvanvig, for example, distinguish three varieties: propositional, objectual or holistic, and atomistic understanding. They do not agree on factivity and transparency of understanding. What then is the difference between their views and that of Jaspers? This essay compares recent epistemological views of understanding with those of Jaspers and critiques his claims about empathetic understanding as being both factive and self-evident or transparent; to show that empathetic understanding of connections between psychic events needs a public criterion for its individuation. (shrink)

Considerable methodological difficulties abound in neuroimaging, and several philosophers of science have recently called into question the potential of neuroimaging studies to contribute to our knowledge of human cognition. These skeptical accounts suggest that functional hypotheses are underdetermined by neuroimaging data. I apply Mayo’s error-statistical account to clarify the evidential import of neuroimaging data and the kinds of inferences it can reliably support. Thus, we can answer the question “What can we reliably learn from neuroimaging?” and make sense of how (...) this knowledge can contribute to novel construals of cognition. (shrink)

The use of platelet rich plasma as a novel treatment is discussed in the context of a qualitative research study comprising 38 interviews with sports medicine practitioners and other stakeholders working within the English Premier League during the 2013–16 seasons. Analysis of the data produced several overarching themes: conservatism versus experimentalism in medical attitudes; therapy perspectives divergence; conflicting versions of appropriate evidence; subcultures; community beliefs/practices; and negotiation of medical decision-making. The contested evidence base for the efficacy of PRP is presented (...) in the context of a broader professional shift towards evidence based medicine within sports medicine. Many of the participants while accepting this shift are still committed to casuistic practices where clinical judgment is flexible and does not recognize a context-free hierarchy of evidentiary standards to ethically justifiable practice. We also discuss a tendency in the data collected to consider the use of deceptive, placebo-like, practices among the clinician participants that challenge dominant understandings of informed consent in medical ethics. We conclude that the complex relation between evidence and ethics requires greater critical scrutiny for this emerging specialism within the medical community. (shrink)